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RECENT DECISIONS
ZONING-Nonconforming Use-Owner of nonconforming use
has vested right to extend use from part to entirety of tract
after tract has been annexed by municipality and zoned residential. Conway v. City of Greenville (S.C. 1970).
Between 1953 and 1957, the plaintiff and her husband purchased a number of plots of land totalling sixteen acres, approximately six acres located within and ten acres without the city
limits of Greenville. In 1954 the plaintiff began a construction
business on the then acquired portion of this tract. In addition
to the company's office and warehouses, she built two small
residences for members of the family and developed a small private lake. Since the plaintiff's business was a sizeable one, a
large quantity of equipment and materials was stored in the
open on the tract, but not all of the tract was actually used for
business purposes.
In 1963 the remaining ten acres was annexed to the, City of
Greenville and, pursuant to zoning ordinances, zoned "A-1
Single-family dwelling district." In response to this, the plaintiff petitioned for a rezoning of the entire tract; however, only
a small portion fronting on a heavily travelled highway was
rezoned "H Light industrial district." The plaintiff did not
appeal, but continued to use the tract for business purposes as
she had before. The plaintiff later negotiated an agreement
whereby a shopping center fronting on the highway would be
built on the tract. The proposed shopping center would, however, extend from the "H Light industrial district" onto the
land zoned "A-1 Single-family dwelling district" where it would
not be permitted. The plaintiff's application for a rezoning of
the area in question to "E-1 Shopping center district" was
recommended by the City Planning and Zoning Commission, but
was subsequently rejected by the City Council of Greenville. The
master in equity for Greenville County filed a report recommending relief, but the trial court reversed and dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff then appealed to the South
Carolina Supreme Court where the City of Greenville contended that the plaintiff's business should be confined to its
present area and not be allowed to extend to the entire tract.1
1. In her appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the plaintiff
asserted that she was entitled to a rezoning as a matter of constitutional right
since her property was in use in a higher zoning category at the time the

property was annexed into Greenville. She also claimed that the refusal of
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The court, however, found for the plaintiff and held that the
nature of her business was such that she had a vested right to
extend her construction business activities to the entire tract.
Conway v. City of Greenville, 173 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 1970).
In order to protect property owners from retroactive application of zoning ordinances that destroy existing uses, the law
recognizes the nonconforming use 2 The term, nonconforming
use, refers to certain property which is excepted from the application of zoning regulations. Professor Rathkopf, cited by the
court in Conway,3 explains the reason for such an exemption:
If, prior to the adoption of a zoning restriction
(either in an original zoning ordinance or an amendment thereto) property was used for a then lawful
purpose or in a then lawful manner which the ordinance would render thereafter prohibited and nonconforming, such property is generally held to have
acquired a vested right to continue such non-conform4
ing use or non-conforming structure.
In South Carolina the right to continue a nonconforming use
of or on one's property is a vested one and was recognized as
such in James v. City of Greenville.5 This case dealt with the
authority of a municipality to enact a zoning ordinance which
would restrict the use of private property. After indicating that
the authority to zone is derived from the police power, the
James court stated that the power to enact zoning ordinances
was not unlimited and could not be used to suppress or remove
a previously established business from a residential district
without a factual showing that the continuation of the "business
would be detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare." 6
In 1967 the General Assembly of South Carolina passed an
act providing for local and regional comprehensive zoning and
the city council to rezone her property was an abuse of discretion in that it
was an arbitrary and unreasonable decision. For these reasons the plaintiff
sought to have her application for rezoning approved in accordance with her
request for use as a shopping center. The South Carolina Supreme Court
limited its decision to a determination of whether or not the plaintiff had
acquired a vested right to continue her presently nonconforming use on the
entire tract The court left unanswered the question as to whether or not the
plaintiff could now use the tract for a shopping center.
2. 2 A.H. RATHKOPF & C.A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 58 § 1 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF].

3. 173 S.E2d at 651.

4. RATHKOPF ch. 58, § 1.
5. 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955).

6. Id. at 584-85, 88 S.E.2d at 671.
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planning programs 7 which enables municipalities and counties
to adopt zoning regulations in conformity with the conditions
and stipulations of the act. One section of the act describes
nonconformities and how they may be regulated.
The regulations may provide that land, buildings and
structures and the uses thereof which are lawful at the
time of the enactment or amendment of zoning regulations may be continued although not in conformity with
such regulations or amendments, hereinafter called a
nonconformity. The governing authority of any municipality or county may provide in the zoning ordinance
or resolution for the continuance, restoration, reconstruction, extension, or substitution of nonconformities.
Such governing authority may also provide for the
termination of any nonconformity by specifying the
period or periods in which the nonconformity shall be
required to cease or brought into conformance, or by
providing a formula whereby the compulsory termination of nonconformities may be so fixed as to allow for
the recovery or amortization of the investment in such
nonconformity."
This statute in conjunction with the James case, which requires
a factual showing that a nonconforming use would be "detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare"'
before the use may be removed, provides guidelines for the
judiciary in South Carolina to determine whether a nonconformity may or may not be eliminated depending on the factual
situation and circumstances.
In dealing with nonconforming uses, the South Carolina
Supreme Court must, therefore, balance two opposing interests.
First, the court is under a duty to ensure that the vested rights
of an individual property owner are protected from unconstitutional infringement resulting from the restrictive provisions of
a zoning ordinance passed after the owner has commenced his
presently nonconforming use of the property. Second, the court
must help promulgate the general policy of restricting and
eliminating nonconforming uses in order to promote the general
zoning scheme. 10 The Conway case reflects the court's continu7. S.C. CODE ANx. §§ 14-341 to -350.46 (Supp. 1969).

8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-350.17 (Supp. 1969).
9. 227 S.C. at 584-85, 88 S.E2d at 671.
10. RATHxOPF ch. 60, § 1.
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ing attempt to maintain this balance by resorting to a determination based on the facts of a given situation.
In reaching its decision in Conway, the South Carolina Supreme Court employed a flexible formula which was first stated
in the New Jersey case of Gross v. Allan." In that case the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that a property owner's display of single used automobiles at
his service station from time to time, prior to the enactment of
a zoning ordinance, did not establish a nonconforming use of
the property as a used automobile sales lot. The New Jersey
court stated:
The criterion is whether the nature of the incipient
nonconforming use, in the light of the character and
adaptability to such use of the entire parcel, manifestly
implies an appropriation of the entirety to such use
12
prior to the adoption of the restrictive ordinance.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the facts surrounding the case and found that the extension of the plaintiff's
use to the entire tract was implied, gven the "character of the
tract as business property and its adaptability to such use."' 3
The court concluded, therefore, that an appropriation of the
entirety for the plaintiff's use prior to the adoption of the
zoning ordinance was implied from the facts and circumstances
of the case.
After deciding that a nonconforming use within a single tract
of land may be extended to the entire tract, the Conway court
elaborated on the powers of the judiciary to review discretionary
decisions of local zoning authorities. Prior to this case, the
South Carolina court gave great weight to the findings of local
authorities and stated that the court would only exercise its
power to declare an ordinance invalid if the ordinance or regulation was so unreasonable as to impair or destroy constitutional
rights; even then the power would be exercised "carefully and
cautiously."' 4 In Conway the court appears to have exerted its
power of review with less restraint. Citing James v. City of
11. 37 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A.2d 275 (1955); Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 22

(1963); 58 AM. Jun. Zoning § 151 (1948); 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 192 (1958);

ch. 60, § 2.
12. 37 N.J. Super. at 272, 117 A.2d at 280.

RATHKOPF

13. 173 S.E.2d at 651.
14. Rush v. City of Greenville, 246 S.C. 268, 276, 143 S.E.2d 527, 531

(1965) ; Bob Jones Univ. v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 351, 360, 133 S.E.2d

843, 847 (1963); Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S.C. 165,

174, 72 S.E.2d 66, 70 (1952).
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Greenville, the Conway court emphasized that "the determination of whether such ordinances deprive a citizen of constitutional rights is a judicial function and not legislative." 15 In
accounting for its power of review, the court made no mention
of a presumption in favor of local authorities or of the careful
and cautious exercise of the power of review as the earlier cases
had.1 6 It seems probable that the court, in so doing, was qualifying its previous decisions by stating that it would intervene
when it sensed a serious injustice had been forced upon an individual because of an indiscretion or an unreasonable or arbitrary decision by a local authority.
The court in Conway concluded that a property owner has a
vested right to pursue his nonconforming use by extending the
use from a part to the entirety of the parcel; however, he may
do so only if the entire parcel is adaptable to the use which
predominated in the previously limited portion."' The court left
open the question of whether or not the "A-1 Single-family
dwelling district" should be rezoned for commercial purposes so
as to allow the construction of the proposed shopping center.
Whether the plaintiff now has a right to use the tract for the
construction of a shopping center is for the City of Greenville
to determine, subject once again to the review of the courts.
Should the city refuse to grant a rezoning and claim that a
willful discontinuance of the plaintiff's current nonconforming
use (removal of her construction business in order to build a
shopping center) extinguishes that use, the South Carolina
Supreme Court may have the opportunity to review the case
again in light of these possible developments.
GERALD

15. 173 S.E2d at 65Z.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. 173 S.E2d at 651.
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